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THE JUDICIARY RESPONDS TO THE Loss OF
ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
For several centuries judges enjoyed absolute judicial im-
munity. Recent years have seen a decrease in the scope of judi-
cial immunity. The increasing success of suits against judges
has caused many members of the judiciary to purchase judicial
malpractice insurance. The Author questions the current cost of
such insurance by examining the amount and necessity of pro-
tection it affords and the risk of civil liability not already cov-
ered by the state.
I. INTRODUCTION
VIRTUALLY EVERY PRACTICING attorney and law profes-
sor is surprised to learn that many judges carry judicial mal-
practice insurance. This surprise stems from the belief that judges
are immune from suit: a "wrong" decision properly invites an ap-
peal, not a lawsuit against the judge.
While it is true that no attorney will prevail against a judge
for having ruled incorrectly if the judge has proper jurisdiction,
lawsuits against judges for actions undertaken in their role as
judges have been increasingly successful." This increase results
from rulings limiting the traditional scope of absolute judicial im-
munity. Judicial malpractice insurance to indemnify judges
against liability for damages and the attorney's fees required for
the defense of such lawsuits has emerged as one response to such
suits.
This note begins with a general description of who is a
judge,2 why judges are immune, 3 and from what judges are im-
mune.4 It then traces the history of judicial immunity in the
United States and defines the scope of judicial immunity as it ex-
1. Middleton, Immunity in Question, Judges Buy Insurance, 67 A.B.A. J. 1248, 1248
(1981).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 10-21.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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ists today.5 After an overview of the reaction of the judiciary to
the decreasing scope of judicial immunity," two specified responses
are explored: (1) the judiciary's attempts to restore its immunity
via legislation,7 and (2) the judiciary's resort to judicial malprac-
tice insurance.8
Finally, this note critically analyzes the necessity, efficiency,
and public policy grounds of state payment for this coverage.9 The
note concludes that while judicial malpractice insurance serves a
valid purpose, the judiciary must demand that the cost of this in-
surance not outweigh its benefits, and the public should question
the use of tax dollars for its procurement.
II. WHO Is IMMUNE TO WHAT AND WHY?
The doctrine of judicial immunity raises three fundamental
questions: Who is immune? Why is a judge immune? From what
is a judge immune? These preliminary questions are answered
below.
A. Who is Immune?
Determining to whom judicial immunity extends is not as
straightforward as one might expect. The doctrine's applicability
is not restricted to judges of general and limited jurisdiction; sher-
iffs, l0 prosecutors," coroners, 12 court reporters,13 clerks of court,1 4
jurors,1 5 grand jurors,1  witnesses,17 bailiffs,' arbitrators,19  and
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27-95.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 96-103.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 104-20.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 121-33.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 134-86.
10. See, e.g., Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1430-32 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (sheriff
implementing a judge's orders shares absolute immunity under the doctrine of "quasi-judi-
cial" immunity).
11. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976) (same considerations
that underlie common law immunity of judges apply to prosecutors).
12. See, e.g., Lambert v. Garlo, 19 Ohio App. 3d 295, 299, 484 N.E.2d 260, 265
(1985) (rejecting claim that coroners do not enjoy judicial immunity when conducting
investigations).
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Charles, 309 F.Supp. 817, 817-18 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (judicial
immunity extends to court reporter in cause of action for failure to provide full transcript).
14. See, e.g., Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812,
815 (10th Cir. 1981) (judicial immunity encompasses clerks and other functionaries be-
cause they are necessary for the court to fulfill its judicial duties), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
840 (1982).
15. See, e.g., White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1969) (jurors are
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other individuals who have been sued for conduct undertaken in a
judicial capacity 20 have successfully invoked judicial or "quasi-ju-
dicial" immunity. This note examines the doctrine of judicial im-
munity only with respect to judges as that term is commonly un-
derstood. 21 However, the rationales underlying the doctrine of
judicial immunity and the recent limitations that have restricted
the scope of that immunity apply equally to judges and "quasi-
judges" acting in a judicial capacity.
B. Why are Judges Immune?
Judicial opinions and scholarly articles advance both practi-
cal and theoretical support for judicial immunity. The reason most
often emphasized is that fear of reprisal would undermine judicial
independence from the interests of litigants: "[Jiudges must be
free to act without fear of harassment by dissatisfied litigants."22
It is easy to see the danger that a judge presiding over a case with
immune from civil action for damages), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 912 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 67 (1880) (common law provides grand
jurors immunity).
17., See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (witnesses enjoy a com-
mon law immunity).
18. See, e.g., Wolff v. Flanagan, No. 41746 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1980) (LEXIS)
(bailiff immune from liability for damages arising from execution of a ministerial duty).
19. See, e.g., Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (an arbi-
trator is a quasi-judicial officer and arbitration is encouraged by national policy, therefore
the common law rule of immunity applies).
20. Judicial immunity may also extend to mediators, referees, umpires,, elected or
appointed officials who preside over disputes, and support staff to these individuals. The
doctrine generally applies to immunize neutral parties against liability resulting from their
behavior when exhibited pursuant to their responsibility as arbiter of a dispute or adminis-
trator of justice. See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND
THE LAW 183 (1987) ("[N]ot only the judge, but also those performing judicial acts for
the judge, are immune .... ").
21. A judge has been defined as "[a]n officer so named in his commission, who pre-
sides in some court; a public officer, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a
court of justice ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 841 (6th ed. 1990). The term judge is
construed here to also include officials commonly called magistrates, defined as "[m]inor
officials or officers with limited judicial authority; e.g. justices of the peace, judges of police
courts, mayor's courts, or magistrate's courts .... [11n a narrow sense [they are] re-
garded as ... inferior judicial officer[s]." Id. at 857.
22. Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges Be Kings in their
Courts?, 64 JUDICATURE 390, 392 (1981). Judicial independence was emphasized as the
reason for protecting judicial immunity to civil liability in one of the earliest Supreme
Court decisions to address this issue: "For it is a general principle of the highest impor-
tance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the author-
ity vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
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the'knowledge that the losing party might bring a retaliatory suit,
would simply rule against the party least likely to do so.
There are less obvious reasons to protect judges from civil
liability. One scholar has suggested several additional
justifications:
(1) The saving to the public of the drain upon judicial
time that would otherwise be necessitated for the defense
of private litigation; . .. [2] The fear that men of prop-
erty and responsibility might otherwise be deterred from
judicial service; [3] The especial importance of an inde-
pendent judiciary in the American federal and state con-
stitutional systems; [4] The need somewhere of absolute
finality in the litigation of controversies ...; [5] The exis-
tence of adequate opportunities for change of venue, new
trial, or reversal on account of prejudice or error . ..; [6]
The theory. . that judges in their exercise of the judicial
function are under no duty . . . to the individual litigants
before them, but are rather under a duty owing only to the
public collectively and sanctioned sufficiently by the crimi-
nal law and the impeachment or removal power; [7] ...
[T] he feeling .. .that it would be manifestly unfair for
the law to place one in a position the very significance of
which is to require his opinion and accord it especial def-
erence in the matter in hand, and yet at the same time to
penalize him with personal consequences by reference to
the opinion of another or others in regard to the same
matter.2 3
The author added that the continuing vitality of judicial immunity
might rest on another very practical, if cynical, reason: judges
may simply be protecting their own interests. 4
C. Immune to What?
The bases of judicial immunity presented above are insuffi-
cient to support an absolute exemption from the imposition of civil
23. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-
72 (1937) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original). For a criticism of the reasons
behind the policy of judicial immunity listed by Jennings, see King, Judicial Immunity and
Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 549, 579-89
(1978); Note, Immunity of Federal and State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For a
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 727, 741-43 (1977).
24. See Jennings, supra note 23, at 272.
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liability or criminal culpability. For example, a judge accused of
shoplifting could not plead judicial immunity as a defense 25 be-
cause the principal justification for invoking judicial immunity,
fear of reprisal that would bias the judge, is lacking. Similarly, a
judge found to have committed the tort of battery cannot raise
judicial immunity as a defense. 6 The reasons underlying the doc-
trine of judicial immunity apply to immunize judges qua judges
only.
Of course, certain behavior, such as issuing an opinion, is
clearly "judicial," while other behavior, such as shoplifting,
clearly is not. However, some behavior is more difficult to catego-
rize - for instance, hiring a relative as court reporter in favor of
more qualified applicants. Cases discussing such behavior have de-
fined the boundaries of judicial immunity.
D. The History of Judicial Immunity"
1. Early Doctrine
The doctrine of judicial immunity first emerged in England in
the early fourteenth century during the reign of King Edward
111.28 Not until this time "did the familiar distinction between the
25. See, e.g., Luttner, Stokes Found Not Guilty of Dog Food Theft, The Plain
Dealer, July 29, 1989, at IA, col. 1 ("Although [Judge] Stokes acknowledged he took the
$17.25 bag of dog food June 2 without paying for it, he maintained throughout the two-day
trial that he had intended to pay for it and thus was not guilty because he had no criminal
intent."). Judge Stokes, who was acquitted, did not argue that he was insulated from prose-
cution under the doctrine of judicial immunity.
26. See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge found
civilly liable for assault and battery because he acted in a nonjudicial capacity when he
"forced Gregory out the [courtroom] door, threw him to the floor in the process, jumped on
him, and began to beat him."). For a definition of judicial acts performed in a judicial
capacity, see infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
27. More than a brief historical sketch of the development of the judicial immunity
doctrine is beyond the scope of this note. For a more detailed discussion of the history of
judicial immunity, see Stafford, An Overview of Judicial Immunity, STATE CT. J., Summer
1977, at 3 (discussing the doctrine of judicial immunity as applied by state courts); Weis-
berger, The Twilight of Judicial Independence - Pulliam v. Allen, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
537 (1985) (examining early American case law on judicial independence); Note, Pulliam
v. Allen: Delineating the Immunity of Judges from Prospective Relief, 34 CATH. U.L. REV.
829 (1985) (reviewing both the origin and purpose of the judicial immunity doctrine); Case
Comment, Judges - Malpractice? Judicial Immunity, Injunctive Relief and Attorney's
Fees under the Civil Rights Statutes, 14 MaNt. ST. U.L. REv. 588 (1984) (discussing the
history of judicial immunity and the Supreme Court's decision in Pulliam v. Allen).
28. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 235 (Ist ed. 1924) ("as
early as Edward III's reign . . . [it was held] that a litigant could not go beyond the
record, in order to make a judge civilly or criminally liable for an abuse of his
1990]
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review of judgments and complaints against judges arise.""9
Before this distinction was recognized, "[review of a court judg-
ment was, quite simply, a personal action against the judge."3
The doctrine of judicial immunity thus predates by nearly 400
years the other cornerstone of judicial independence, life tenure of
office."'
The United States adopted these two cornerstones of judicial
independence to build a strong judicial branch of government. The
Constitution grants federal judges life tenure,32 and, in the first
American cases to address. the issue, judges were held immune
from liability for actions authorized "by virtue of [their] judicial
power." 33
2. The Supreme Court Definition of Judicial Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States did not review the
doctrine of judicial immunity until after the Civil War,34 at which
time the Court endorsed the doctrine wholeheartedly In Randall
v Brigham,5 a disbarred attorney brought suit alleging that the
state justice who disbarred him had acted arbitrarily and without
proper authority The Court, noting that the "doctrine [of judicial
immunity] is as old as the law,"36 ruled in favor of the judge be-
cause judges "are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts
jurisdiction.").
29. Roth & Hagan, Tracing the Judicial Immunity Doctrine: A View From Kingly
Times to the Present, STATE CT. J., Summer 1982, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Roth & Hagan,
Kingly Times], reprinted in Roth & Hagan, The Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today: Be-
tween the Bench and a Hard Place, 35 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 3 (1984) [hereinafter Roth &
Hagan, The Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today].
30. Id.
31. Weisberger, supra note 27, at 538 n.8 ("[N]ot until the Act of Settlement 12
and 13 William III (1701) [was it] that judges were given tenure independent of the King
during good behavior.").
32. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
33. Lining v. Bentham, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 1, 3 (1796); accord Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day
315, 329 (Conn. 1804) ("[H]owever erroneous his judgment may be, a judge is never
liable, in any civil action, for damages arising from his mistake."); Yates v. Lansing, 5
Johns. 282 (N. Y Sup. Ct. 1810) (chancellor not liable in a civil suit regarding the chan-
cellor's habeas corpus decision), aff'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y 1811); Brodie v. Rutledge, 2
S.C.L. (2 Bay) 28 (1796) (a judge is liable for misdemeanors in office and is subject to
impeachment for misconduct, but cannot be sued for opinions written in his judicial
capacity).
34. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868) (considering state com-
mon law in the absence of Supreme Court precedent).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 536.
[Vol. 41:267
JUDICIAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
• . . unless perhaps where the acts . . . are done maliciously or
corruptly. 37
Three years later, the Court removed even this limitation. In
Bradley v. Fisher,8 an attorney alleged that a judge, with mali-
cious and corrupt motivation, had blacklisted him from practicing
in certain courts.3 9 Although the Court agreed with the attorney
that the judge had improperly blacklisted him, the Court ruled
that the judge could not be held liable for damages: "[J]udges of
courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil ac-
tions for their judicial acts, even when such acts, . . are alleged
to have been done maliciously, or corruptly."40 Addressing Ran-
dall's suggestion that malicious judicial acts might carry civil lia-
bility,41 the Bradley Court stated, "[Those] qualifying words...
were not intended as an expression -of opinion that in the cases
supposed such liability would exist ....
While the Bradley Court broadened the scope of judicial im-
munity on one front by immunizing judges even when their rul-
ings were clearly based on improper motives, it adopted two rules
that served to narrow the range of judicial immunity on other
fronts. First, the Bradley Court drew an important distinction be-
tween judges acting "in excess of their jurisdiction" 43 and judges
acting "[w]here there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter . . . .- The Court ruled that judges acting in clear ab-
sence of jurisdiction could be held liable for damages, regardless
of whether their actions were malicious or corrupt. For instance, if
a probate court judge tried and sentenced a party for a criminal
offense, the judge could not assert judicial immunity.45 However,
37. Id.
38. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
39. Id. at 338. The attorney defended an accused conspirator in President Lincoln's
assassination. Shortly after a hung jury trial, the presiding judge issued an order restricting
the attorney from appearing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Id. at 336-
37.
40. Id. at 351.
41. See supra text accompanying note 37.
42. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, C.J.) ("[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave un-
redressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than subject those who try to do their duty
to the constant threat of retaliation."), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). For a list of
sources criticizing Judge Hand's position, see infra note 99.
43. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
44. Id. at 351-52.
45. Id. at 352; see also, e.g., Vickrey v. Dunivan, 59 N.M. 90, 279 P.2d 853 (1955)
(justice of the peace, who tried motorist under a village ordinance he knew did not exist,
1990]
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if a judge in a criminal court of general jurisdiction tried and sen-
tenced a party for conduct not proscribed by law, judicial immu-
nity would protect the judge from personal liability. 6 Hence the
Bradley Court established the parameters of judicial immunity by
looking first to judicial subject matter jurisdiction. No judicial act,
even a malicious one, performed within the jurisdiction of the
court could form the basis of a judge's personal liability.47 How-
ever, if the court acted without subject matter jurisdiction, an
honest mistake or an otherwise valid ruling could be grounds for a
lawsuit.4 8
The second important limitation which the Bradley Court
adopted was the restriction of judicial immunity to "judicial
acts."'49 An exact definition of the term "judicial act" was not at-
tempted by the Supreme Court until over 100 years later,50 and
this attempt received much criticism.5 1 Put simply, a judicial act
is one that particularly requires judicial power and discretion; it is
and who knew offense, if any, occurred outside his village, was not empowered with juris-
diction and thus was not immune).
46. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352; see also, e.g., Huendling v. Jensen, 168
N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969) (finding justice of the peace who was empowered to issue arrest
warrants but did so without probable cause, for purpose of collecting unpaid checks and
thereby earning a twenty percent commission, immune from a suit for damages).
47. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
48. Id. at 351-52. The "absence of jurisdiction" exception to judicial immunity as
adopted by the Bradley Court was first proclaimed in 1612. King, supra note 23, at 570
n.158.
49. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350. The "nonjudicial act exception" to judicial
immunity adopted in Bradley was first recognized in 1589. King, supra note 23, at 576
n.223.
50. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-62 (1978) (enumerating factors that
determine whether an act is "judicial"); infra note 52 and accompanying text.
51. See Note, What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1503, 1511 n.61 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Act] (analyzing
various cases in which the Supreme Court's definition of a judicial act has led to holdings
of judicial immunity); see also, Note, Immunity Doctrines and Employment Doctrines of
Judges, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 621 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Immunity Doctrines] (dis-
cussing the inconsistency of the application of the Stump "judicial act" test in determining
whether a judge's employment decisions are "judicial" for purposes of immunity); Note,
An Argument Against Judicial Immunity For Employment Decisions, 11 NovA L. REv.
1127 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Employment Decisions] (comparing inconsistent cases in-
volving judicial immunity with respect to employment decisions and suggesting that judges
not be immune from suit for damages arising from their decisions). Compare Rheuark v.
Shaw, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980) (supervision of court reporters held a judicial func-
tion), cert. denied sub nom., Rheuark v. Dallas County, 450 U.S. 931 (1981) with Rich-
ardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982) (appointment of judicial officers is an
administrative, ministerial, or executive act, not judicial in nature).
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an act that only a judge may perform.52 The distinction is that
"'judicial capacity' is a narrower concept than 'official ca-
pacity,' "3 and only those acts performed within the judicial ca-
pacity are immune from civil liability Thus, a judge's act may be
an official act yet not a judicial act.
Judicial immunity does not encompass official acts. Acts that
are official but not judicial might be labelled "ministerial, admin-
istrative, executive, [or] legislative 954 Among these official
but nonjudicial acts are selecting jurors (ministerial),55 hiring and
firing employees (administrative)," evaluating and appointing ju-
dicial officers (executive),57 and promulgating to the state bar a
Code of Professional Responsibility (legislative) 58 These acts are
52. As the Supreme Court has noted, "Because [the judge] performed the type of act
normally performed only by judges we find no merit to respondents' argument that
the informality with which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and deprived him
of his absolute immunity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 362-63 (1978) (emphasis added); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (6th ed. 1990) (Judicial act defined as "[a]n act by [a]
member of judicial department in construing law or applying it to a particular state of
facts.").
53. Note, Judicial Act, supra note 51, at 1512.
54. Id. at 1508 (footnotes omitted).
55. See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) ("The duty of selecting
jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of
a judge It is merely a ministerial act ").
56. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 514 F Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981)
("[T]he Court is not persuaded that a County Judge, in hiring or firing county employees,
is exercising a judicial function. It is clear that these duties are purely administrative and
ministerial in scope."). But see Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F Supp. 474, 477-79 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (firing a probation officer is a judicial act because a probation officer's duties are
intertwined with judicial responsibility, and thus judicial immunity protects a judge from
liability for monetary damages).
For the purposes of judicial immunity, the employment decisions of judges have not
been recognized consistently as nonjudicial acts. See generally Note, Immunity Doctrines,
supra note 51 (examines the inconsistency of decisions categorizing the same employment
decision as judicial and ministerial, and concludes that the qualified immunity applicable to
government executives should be applied to judicial employment decisions); Note, Judicial
Act, supra note 51 (examines substantive and procedural problems arising from the Stump
decision's broad definition of a judicial act); Note, Employment Decisions, supra note 51.
The Supreme Court, addressing the issue for the first time, found that employment deci-
sions are not protected by judicial immunity. Forrester v, White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
57. See, e.g., Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911., 914 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[Riesponsibilities of recommending candidates for judicial office to the appointing offi-
cials and of reviewing reappointment petitions bear little resemblance to the charac-
teristic of the judicial process that gave rise to the recognition of absolute immunity for
judicial officers Rather, these responsibilities are executive in nature
(citations omitted)).
58. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc., 446
U.S. 719, 731 (1980) ("[P]ropounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of
rulemaking."). Acts undertaken by a judge that are classified as "legislative" rather than
1990]
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all, in some sense, job-related, but they are not judicial and, there-
fore, are subject to liability, because none of the reasons underly-
ing the doctrine of judicial immunity5" apply. For instance, pro-
tecting a judges's independent discretion in hiring a court clerk is
not essential to the dispensation of justice.
Actions of a judge which are neither judicial nor official are,
a fortiori, beyond the scope of judicial immunity. Were it other-
wise, every action of a judge would be protected from attack.
Wholly unofficial conduct involving abuse of judicial power60 or
criminal behavior 61  is properly not immune from sanction.
"Whether the act done by [a judge is] judicial or not is to be
determined by its character, and not by the character of the
agent."62
3. The Supreme Court Creates a Caveat
The broad outlines of judicial immunity laid down in Bradley
remain the basis for determining judicial liability today. Judicial
acts performed with proper jurisdiction have enjoyed absolute im-
munity from civil liability since Bradley was decided in 1872 -
until recently. Oddly, at the moment that Bradley articulated the
rules defining the scope of judicial immunity, Congress enacted
seemingly unrelated civil rights legislation that would lead to the
first serious erosion of those rules over 100 years later.6"
In order to implement the Civil Rights amendments,6 4 Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,65 codified as 42 U.S.C.
judicial may be protected nonetheless under "legislative immunity"; this was the holding in
Consumer's Union. Id. at 731-34.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
60. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (damage award upheld
against judge who had a coffee and frankfurter vendor brought in handcuffs to his cham-
bers where the judge berated and threatened the vendor for selling a "putrid" cup of
coffee).
61. See, e.g., Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945) ("Judi-
cial title does not render its holder immune to crime even when committed behind the
shield of judicial office." (citation omitted)). For an overview of judicial misconduct, crimi-
nal and otherwise, see King, supra note 23, at 555-63.
62. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879). Decided only seven years after
Bradley, the Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Virginia, seized upon the distinction between
judicial and nonjudicial acts to find a judge liable for purposefully excluding "citizens .
of African race and black color" from juries. Id. at 340.
63. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 while Bradley was being argued
before the Supreme Court. Note, supra note 23, at 734.
64. U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV & XV.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
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§ 1983 ("section 1983"). Section 1983 imposes civil liability on
"[e]very person who [under the color of state law] causes
[another] person within the jurisdiction [of the United States]
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws "66 At the time of the enactment,
certain members of Congress recognized that application of the
statute to "every person" would conflict with doctrines of immu-
nity protecting certain government officials, but the issue was not
resolved. 7
The issue of section 1983's impact on judicial immunity first
arose in Pierson v Ray 68 Several ministers were found guilty'of
breach of the peace while demonstrating for racial integration in
Mississippi. 9 The presiding judge, Judge Spencer, "convicted the
ministers even though he had been made aware of a Supreme
Court decision supporting the ministers' actions."70 Later, in a de
novo trial, the court directed a verdict of not guilty in favor of one
clergyman, and charges against the others were withdrawn. The
clergymen then brought suit against Judge Spencer claiming that
the conviction violated their civil rights.71 The Pierson Court
found the value of judicial immunity to outweigh that of protect-
ing a citizen's civil rights, holding that judicial immunity was not
abolished by section 1983.2 Thus, Judge Spencer's immunity was
upheld even though he violated the clergymen's civil rights.
In Stump v Sparkman"3 the Court more clearly defined the
scope of judicial immunity The mother of a slightly retarded, fif-
teen year old girl filed a petition requesting Judge Stump to order
her daughter to undergo fallopian tubal ligation. The mother
feared that her daughter, who had started to date, was unable to
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
67. See Note, supra note 23, at 738-40; Case Comment, supra note 27, at 591 n.24
(discussing the legislative history of Section 1983 and recounting the Congressional debate
over the possibility that section 1983 would limit judicial immunity).
68. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The impact of section 1983 on legislative immunity had
already been adjudicated. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (holding that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not affect legislative immunity). Other forms of immunity
have been successfully raised by defendants to shield themselves from section 1983 liabil-
ity. See Note, supra note 27, at 831 n.15.
69. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
70. Case Comment, supra note 27, at 592.
71. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 550.
72. Id. at 554.
73. 435 U.S. 349, rehg dented, 436 U.S. 951 (1978).
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comprehend the possible consequences of sexual activity. 4 Judge
Stump granted the petition "in an ex parte proceeding without
notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem. 17 5 The daughter was sterilized less
than one week later in an operation which she was told was an
appendectomy. 6 When the daughter, then married, discovered
two years afterwards why she could not become pregnant, she
brought suit against Judge Stump for violation of her civil
rights.7 Relying on Bradley, the Supreme Court held Judge
Stump immune from civil liability because he had not acted "in
clear absence of' subject matter jurisdiction;7 8 rather, his order
was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction which, under the Bradley
formulation of judicial immunity, did not carry with it any
liability.7
Three justices dissented, agreeing with the majority's analysis
of judicial immunity but maintaining that Judge Stump's behavior
was so outrageous that it was not a judicial act."° The majority of
the Court, however, found that Judge Stump's act was judicial
and was also within his jurisdiction; in so finding, the majority
"sacrifice[d] the individual to the system in no uncertain terms." '81
Given this history of strong judicial immunity, one can imag-
74. Id. at 351 n.1. It is questionable whether the daughter was even slightly re-
tarded. The only evidence to this effect was the mother's sworn affidavit. In fact, the
daughter "attended public school and had been promoted each year with her class." Id. at
351.
75. Id. at 360.
76. Id. at 353.
77. Id. The daughter also brought suit against the doctors and hospital involved in
the operation, her mother, and her mother's attorney. Id. Modern judicial action of this
type is not peculiar to Judge Stump. See, e.g., Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562 (lth Cir.
1983) (judge held immune from liability for ordering husband to undergo a vasectomy as a
condition of a favorable property settlement in a divorce proceeding).
78. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357.
79. Id. at 364.
80. See Id. at 368-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
81. Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times, supra note 29, at 7. It is not surprising, as Roth
and Hagan note, that "Stump has elicited a uniformly' critical response from scholarly
writers." Id.; see, e.g., Maher, Federally-Defined Judicial Immunity: Some Quixotic Re-
flections on an Unwarranted Imposition, 88 DICK. L. REV. 326 (1984). The Stump ruling
is especially threatening because it violates the doctrine of ubi jus ibi remedium ("where
there is a right, there is a remedy"). Id. at 333 n.43. This doctrine is at the core of any
credible system of justice. "'The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.'"
Id. at 329 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163 (1803)); see also
Comment, Pulliam's Pacific Progeny: Deep Pockets in the Judge's Robes?, 17 PAC. Li.
461, 479 n.176 (1985) (listing sources critical of Pulliam).
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me Magistrate Pulliam's shock when, in 1984, the Supreme Court
ruled that she was liable for over $80,00082 because her conduct
caused private injury to a plaintiff - even though her actions
were indisputably judicial acts within her subject matter jurisdic-
tion.83 Magistrate Pulliam had set bail for several defendants ac-
cused of nonjailable offenses.84 When some of the accused individ-
uals were unable to make bail, she ordered them incarcerated.
Richmond Allen, one of the jailed defendants, sued Magistrate
Pulliam for violating his civil rights. Allen did not seek monetary
damages; rather, he sought injunctive relief to prevent Pulliam
from continuing this practice.8 5 The federal district court found
Pulliam's actions unconstitutional and enjoined Pulliam from en-
gaging in such conduct.8 ' In addition, the district court awarded
Allen attorney's fees of $7,03887 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.8 Pul-
82. Magistrate Pulliam was found liable for $7,038 in attorney's fees by the district
court in which the original lawsuit was heard. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 526 (1984).
After appeals through the Supreme Court, however, Magistrate Pulliam's liability for at-
torney's fees had increased to over $80,000. Legal Fees Equity Act: Hearings on S. 1580,
S. 1794 and S. 1795 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings]. By
agreement of the parties this sum was reduced to $43,691.09. Weisberger, supra note 27,
at 554.
83. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). The Supreme Court had previously indi-
cated in dicta that injunctive relief against judges coupled with an award of attorney's fees
might be appropriate in some circumstances. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 738-39 (1980). Moreover, at least one article dis-
cussed the possibility of a Pulliam-type decision as early as 1982. See Roth & Hagan,
Kingly Times, supra note 29, at 19 (discussing the possibility that if judicial immunity did
not bar injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney's fees awards could be granted).
84. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 525 (the maximum penalty for the underlying offense was
simply a fine).
85. Id.
86. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 377 (4th Cir. 1982), afl'd sub nom., Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
87. Id. at 380.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sectionf] 1983 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevail-
ing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.")
Section 1988 has been called a "fee-shifting" statute in that it provides an exception to the
"American Rule" that each party bears its own attorney's fees. See Comment, supra note
81, at 480-82 (discussing the American law of attorneys' fees awards). The Supreme Court
has found it "clear from the legislative history that § 1988 was enacted because existing
fee arrangements were thought not to provide an adequate incentive to lawyers particularly
to represent plaintiffs in unpopular civil rights cases." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561, 586 (1986). This rationale has also been called the "private attorney general" doc-
trine. The availability of attorney's fees encourages private parties to bring injunctive ac-
tions seeking to prohibit inappropriate judicial conduct. Since such an action is prospective
in its effect, it redounds to the benefit of the general public. Newman v. Piggie Park En-
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liam appealed the award, claiming judicial immunity. 9 The Su-
preme Court affirmed, despite finding that Pulliam had acted in
her judicial capacity and within her subject matter jurisdiction. 0
The Court held that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not
preclude injunctive relief, as opposed to money damages, against a
judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity.9 ' Moreover, judicial
immunity does not preclude a statutory award of attorney's fees
generated in obtaining that injunctive relief.9 2
Pulliam was a 5-4 decision, and the dissent argued that the
rationale for immunizing judges against civil liability for mone-
tary damages applies equally t6 liability for attorney's fees.93 Nev-
ertheless, the majority found support for its holding in both an
historical analysis of the judicial immunity doctrine and an analy-
sis of congressional intent in enacting section 1983.94 "In so hold-
ing, the Court broke with 400 years of common-law doctrine and
sent shock waves through the entire judicial community. ' '9 5 The
immunity of judges from economic liability arising from a juris-
dictionally proper judicial act was no longer absolute after
Pulliam.
III. REACTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE Loss OF ABSOLUTE
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Before the Pulliam decision, one judge and his law clerk
wrote a prescient article discussing the possibility of injunctive re-
lief and associated attorney's fees awards against judges.96 The
article also discussed the range of options that the judiciary as a
whole could take to preserve their immunity. One option was to do
nothing: "It is not an irresponsible position, given the continuing
strength of judicial immunity . . . .,, Of course, Stump v.
ters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
89. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 527.
90. Id. at 524-25.
91. Id. at 541-42.
92. Id. at 544.
93. Id. at 557.
94. Id. at 529-44.
95. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMMUNITY RESTORATION ACT.
S. REP. No. 556, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988) (recommending passage of a bill to re-
verse Pulliam).
96. Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times, supra note 29. Judge Roth serves in the Multno-
mah County Circuit Court in Portland, Oregon and is the Chairman of the Judicial Immu-
nity Committee of the American Bar Association.
97. Id. at 19.
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Sparkman98 lent support for this confidence, although Pulliam
proved such reliance misplaced. The judiciary also had the option
of proposing a qualified, rather than absolute, immunity.99 This
option would preempt more serious and uncontrolled erosion of
immunity by the courts. Alternatively, the judiciary might seek
national legislation instituting qualified or absolute immunity
standards. 100 If adequately drafted, such legislation would prevent
the erosion of judicial immunity. Finally, "insurance coverage for
liability outside the reach of judicial immunity"101 was suggested;
coverage could include indemnification against liability for acts
not protected under judicial immunity in any case.102
The judicial community did not collectively pursue any of
these options (except the first) before Pulliam. After Pulliam, of
course, reactions 0" were swift. The judiciary has since pursued
two of the options proposed in order to restore their judicial im-
munity. First, the judiciary has lobbied Congress for legislation to
extend judicial immunity to actions for injunctive relief and attor-
98. 435 U.S. 349, reh'g denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978).
99. Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times, supra note 29, at 20-21. The authors suggested
holding judges liable for only those monetary damages resulting from malicious acts under-
taken within their jurisdiction. Id. Also discussed, but dismissed as less attractive, was a
version of judicial immunity making judges liable for negligent acts within their jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 21. Another suggestion was that perhaps different levels of immunity should be
applied to non-judicial acts, to judicial acts that do not involve constitutional or civil rights
violations, and to judicial acts that do involve such violations. Id.
Many commentators criticized Pierson and Stump for extending judicial immunity to
actions for damages brought under section 1983 and called for limits on judicial immunity.
See, e.g., King, supra note 23 (calling for a lifting of the privilege in the case of grossly
reckless or intentionally malicious judicial acts); Way, supra note 22 (arguing against im-
munity for malicious or negligent judicial acts); Note, supra note 23 (proposal for limiting
immunity to good faith judicial acts); Note, Employment Decisions, supra note 51 (argu-
ing that traditional rationales for judicial immunity do not apply to suits based on judges
employment decisions). By 1982 "commentators [were] nearly unanimous in their call for
an end to absolute judicial immunity .. " Aliperti & Fitch, A Glance at the Recent
Literature Concerning Judicial Immunity, STATE Cr. J., Summer 1982, at 15, 15.
100. Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times, supra note 29, at 21-22 (examining promulga-
tion of congressional legislation or a model act to establish immunity standard).
101. Id. at 22.
102. Acts not protected by judicial immunity in any case include "the kinds of acts
for which there is precedent for exposure. . . administrative, ministerial, enforcement, and
nonjudicial [acts]." Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
103. In fact, these might be considered over-reactions. See infra text accompanying
notes 143-44. It should be noted that section 1983 prohibits violation of a person's civil
rights under color of any state law. See supra text accompanying note 66. As such, only
state judges, not federal judges, are liable for attorney's fees and injunctive relief under
Pulliam. Thus, the judiciary's reaction, or over-reaction, to Pulliam represents the response
of state judges.
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ney's fees. Second, the judiciary sought and obtained "judicial
malpractice insurance" to provide more immediate protection
from their exposure to civil liability.
A. Proposed Legislation
The judiciary's concern over the loss of absolute judicial im-
munity was quickly impressed upon national legislators. Less than
nine months after Pulliam v. Allen'" was decided by the Su-
preme Court, congressional legislation was introduced to reverse
its effect. 10 5 The objective of House Bill 877 was "[t]o prohibit the
award of attorney's fees against judges growing out of actions for
injunctive relief."'106 To this end, the legislation proposed amend-
ing section 1988 to disallow recovery of attorney's fees when the
underlying civil rights action is brought "against a judge or other
judicial officer arising out of acts done or omitted in the perform-
ance of the duties of that office . . . .,,o Within nine months,
three additional bills with the same objective had been introduced
in Congress. 08
Of these initial proposals to overturn the ruling of Pulliam,
Senate Bills 1794 and 1795 were the first to receive hearings. 0 9
The first two witnesses at these hearings were Judge Peterson,
Chairman of the Committee on Judicial Immunity for the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices, 110 and Judge Dillin, representing the Judi-
104. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
105. Pulliam was decided on May 14, 1984. Id. at 522. House Bill 877, H.R. 877,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), was introduced on January 31, 1985 and referred to the
House Judiciary Committee. [1985-861 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 28,199.
106. H.R. 877, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1985).
107. Id. at 2.
108. See H.R. 2170, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (proposing amendment of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988), to provide that
attorney's fees may not be assessed under that act against members of judiciary acting in
judicial capacity); S. 1794, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (proposing amendment of section
1988 to exempt state judges and judicial officers from assessmeft of attorney's fees in cases
where such a judge would be immune from damages arising out of the same act or omis-
sion on which the complaint is founded); S. 1795, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (proposing
amendment of section 1988 to provide that in actions against state judges, such judges
shall not be held liable for attorney's fees).
109. Hearings on both Senate Bill 1794 and Senate Bill 1795 were held before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 29,
1985. Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings, supra note 82 (purpose of the hearings was to
allow Congress an opportunity to comprehensively review attorney's fees policies).
110. See Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings, supra note 82, at 180. The Conference of
Chief Justices is an organization composed of "the highest judicial officer[s] of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth[s] of Puerto Rico ... [and] the
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cial Conference of the United States."'1 Several other legal ex-
perts participated in these hearings to urge the expeditious
passage of legislation restoring absolute judicial immunity.1 2 This
strong lobbying by the judiciary met with opposition from repre-
sentatives of civil rights groups"13 who argued that "'[t] he only
thing [that the possibility of injunctions] chills, . . . is conduct so
outrageous that a [federal] district judge might enjoin it, and we
want to chill that kind of conduct.' "114 Senate Bills 1794 and
1795 did not progress beyond committee action, nor did the two
similar House Bills."15
Judicial lobbying of Congress did not subside, however, and
new legislation attempting to restore judicial immunity has since
been introduced in three successive Congresses."' In fact, the Ju-
Northern Mariana Islands, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam and the Virgin
Islands." Informational Literature on the Conference of Chief Justices (1989) (available
from the National Center for State Courts). The group was founded "to meet and discuss
matters of importance in improving the administration of justice, rules and methods of
procedure, and the organization and operation of state courts and judicial systems, and to
make recommendations and bring about improvements on such matters." Id.
11. The Judicial Conference of the United States is a statutorily mandated annual
conference of federal judges, which has as its purpose "prepar[ing] plans for assignment of
judges to or from circuits or districts[,] . . . [and] promot[ing] uniformity of management
procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business." 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The
conference also "submit[s] to Congress an annual report of. . . its recommendations for
legislation." Id.
112. See Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings, supra note 82, at 252, 287.
113. E. Richard Larson, representing the American Civil Liberties Union, argued
against Senate Bills 1794 and 1795 during the Senate hearings. Legal Fees Equity Act
Hearings. supra note 82, at 312-15; see also Wermeil, Judges Make Little Headway in
Seeking Legislative Remedy to High Court Ruling, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at B5, col.
1 ("[legislative] proposals this year and in the past have faced stiff opposition from civil-
rights groups that view the federal courts as a check on state judges.").
114. Wermeil, supra note 113, at B5, col. 1. Civil liberties lawyers supported the
Pulliam decision: "'We argued that absolute immunity for judges was wrong in the first
place,' . . . . '[No] judge who systematically violates her trust [as in Pulliam] should be
allowed to get away with it.'" Frank, Judicial Jeopardy: Liability Alarm in Rights Cases,
70 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 29, 29 (quoting Burt Neuborne, legal director of the American
Civil Liberties Union in New York City) (brackets in original).
115. Of the four bills introduced in the 99th Congress designed to overrule Pulliam
v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), only Senate Bills 1794 and 1795 were referred to the appro-
priate committee for discussion; none made it to a full floor debate in Congress. See infra
note 118.
116. The following legislation has been introduced attempting to overturn Pulliam:
H.R. 877, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter House Bill 877]
(preventing the award of attorney's fees arising out of actions against judges for
injunctive relief);
H.R. 2170, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) [hereinafter House Bill 2170]
(preventing the award of attorney's fees against judges acting in a judicial
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dicial Conference of the United States and the Conference of
Chief Justices proposed the wording of at least two of the bills
introduced to overturn Pulliam.117 However, none of these efforts
has proceeded beyond committee consideration.1 18 "[T]rying to
persuade Congress has been anything but easy for the state
judges, despite having the support of the policy-making organiza-
capacity);
S. 1794, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1794] (excus-
ing state judges and judicial officers from award of attorney's -fees if they would
be immunized from the underlying action);
S. 1795, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1795]
(prohibiting the liability of state judges for attorney's fees in judicial actions);
S. 1482, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 614 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1482]
(preventing award of attorney's fees against judges or judicial officers immu-
nized from the underlying action);
S. 1512, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1512]
(preventing liability for attorney's fees for state judges in judicial actions);
S. 1515, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1515] (im-
munizing judicial officers for actions made in an official capacity);
S. 590, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Senate Bill 590] (confer-
ring immunity on judicial officers for official acts).
The status of these pieces of legislation is discussed infra, note 118.
117. S. REP. No. 556, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.3 (1988) ("The bills ...are S.
1512 and Section 614 of S. 1482, proposed respectively by the Conference of Chief Justices
and the Judicial Conference of the United States.").
118. Status of the legislation listed supra, note 116, is as follows:
Ninety-Ninth Congress: Senate Bill 1794 was not approved by the Constitution Sub-
committee of the Judiciary Committee. [1985-1986] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,034. Senate
Bill 1795 was approved by the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, but
"was never considered by the full Judiciary Committee." S. REP. No. 556, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1988). Neither House Bill 877 nor 2170 received any hearing at all within the
House Judiciary Committee. [1985-1986] 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,008, 35,032.
One Hundredth Congress: The critical language conferring judicial immunity in Sen-
ate Bill 1482 was excised before the Bill was passed by the full Senate, incorporated into
House Bill 4870, and signed into law. [1987-1988] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,031. Senate
Bill 1512 received hearings in the Courts Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, but was never reported by the full Judiciary Committee. Id. at 21,032. Senate Bill
1515 was favorably reported by the full Judiciary Committee, but was never considered or
voted upon by the entire Senate. Id.
One Hundred First Congress: Senate Bill 590 was favorably reported by the full Judi-
ciary Committee on September 18, 1990. S. REP. No. 465, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
However, Senate Bill 590 was not considered by the full Senate before the 101st Congress
adjourned on October 28, 1990. Telephone interview with Janie Osborne, staff member of
the office of Senator Howard Metzenbaum (November 26, 1990). There are two legislative
means to prevent the passage of a bill; the legislature may reject a bill or allow it to die. A
rejected bill, one which has received an unfavorable vote by a full house of the legislature,
is generally not reintroduced. A bill dies when it has not been voted on by a full house of
the legislature by the end of a session. A bill that dies is often reintroduced in a subsequent
session. While a legislative decision to allow a bill to die prevents its present enactment,
such a decision is not tantamount to rejection.
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tions of the federal and state judiciary and of the American Bar
Association.""1 " Passing legislation to overturn Supreme Court
rulings is normally a long and difficult process. Nonetheless, judi-
cial organizations are likely to continue to press for legislation
amending section 1988 until their goal of restoring absolute judi-
cial immunity is achieved. 2
B. Judicial Malpractice Insurance
The judiciary knew that attempts to restore judicial immu-
nity through legislation would involve at best frequent setbacks
and delay, and at worst no success at all. Over six years have
passed since judges were first exposed to liability for attorney's
fees by Pulliam, and legislation reversing this exposure has yet to
be enacted. To protect their members, various judicial organiza-
tions contacted commercial insurance companies in 1984 to re-
quest the development of judicial malpractice insurance. Insur-
ance companies responded quickly by making professional liability
insurance policies available to judges. These policies insure against
attorney's fees awards as well as other sources of liability 121
The most successful effort to procure liability insurance re-
sulted after representatives from the Judicial Immunity Commit-
tee of the State Trial Judges Conference and from the Judicial
119. Wermeil, supra note 113, at B5, col. 1.
120. The Conference of Chief Justices, for example, sent a letter to all of its mem-
bers dated January 15, 1988, which mentioned that "efforts to amend 43 [sic] U.S.C. 1988
remain in progress," and which informed its members that an annual survey would be
undertaken to study the impact of Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). National Center
for State Courts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation Against Judges: 1988 Survey Results app. B
at I (July 1989) [hereinafter Litigation Survey].
121. Complete Equities Markets, Inc. actually began offering professional liability
insurance to state and federal judges in 1981. Hagedorn, Judges, Immune No More, Seek
Malpractice Insurance, Wall St. J., July 26, 1989, at BI, col. 3; see also Middleton, supra
note 1, at 1248 ("At least two insurance companies and six brokers now offer such policies
nationwide "). These policies insured against exposure to liability for legal defense
fees and for work-related administrative, legislative, or executive acts which were not cov-
ered by judicial immunity even before Pulliam. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
After Pulliam, various state judicial organizations contacted Complete Equities Mar-
kets, Inc., as well as National Union Fire Insurance Company, American Home Insurance
Company, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, to obtain insurance coverage
against Pulliam-type awards. National Union agreed to design a new policy for state
judges; the other companies agreed to endorse policies originally designed as attorney's
malpractice policies. All four companies provide judicial malpractice insurance today, al-
though National Union is by far the largest provider of this coverage because its policy was
endorsed by the American Bar Association. Telephone interview with Judge Phillip J.
Roth, Chairman, Judicial Immunity Committee, American Bar Association (Oct. 5, 1989).
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Immunity Committee of the American Bar Association met with
the National Union Fire Insurance Company ("National
Union").122 National Union designed an insurance contract that
was later adopted as a model policy of judicial liability insurance
by the Conference of Chief Justices. In March 1984, the Ameri-
can Bar Association granted National Union "exclusive under-
writing privileges through 1987.''123 Herbert L. Jamison and
Company, an insurance broker and managing general agent for
National Union, began marketing the policy exclusively soon after
Pulliam was handed down.
Currently, National Union judicial malpractice insurance
policies cover 2,496 state judges. 24 Most of these judges have
bought individual policies for themselves, paying $800 annually125
for a $2 million policy with no deductible. 26 Other judges receive
the same coverage under a group policy purchased for them by
their employer-state at a cost of $650 per judge. 27 Coverage
122. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania is a mem-
ber company of American International Group ("A.I.G."). A.I.G. is a holding company for
various insurance companies operating throughout the United States. A.M. BEST Co.,
BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS (PROPERTY-CASUALTY) 213 (1989).
"[M]embers of the American International Group ... are assigned a Best's [financial
strength] Rating of A (Superior)" and "[tihe financial size category of the group is Class
XV." Id. at 215. A Class XV financial size category rating means that A.I.G. has a policy-
holder's surplus of over two billion dollars. Policyholder's surplus "is the difference between
total admitted assets and total liabilities" of the company. Id. at xiii.
123. Roth & Hagan, Kingly Times, supra note 29, at 13.
124. Letter to author from Ernest S. Zavodnyik, Staff Director, Judicial Administra-
tion Division, American Bar Association (Nov. 27, 1989). Of the 2,496 judges covered,
1,005 were covered by master policies bought by states to insure all their judges. Id.
The 2,496 judges insured by National Union represent roughly ten percent of the mar-
ket: "[a]bout 20,000 state judges, justices of the peace, magistrates, referees, hearing ex-
aminers and commissioners are eligible for coverage. ... Quade, Judicial Insurance, 71
A.B.A. J. 21, 21 (1985).
125. The annual premium for the National Union Policy was $425 when it was first
made available; the rate was increased to $800 in 1986. Telephone interview with Lou
Barbaro, Vice President, Herbert L. Jamison & Co. (Feb. 23, 1990).
126. The limits of liability are $1 million per claim, and $2 million per year for all
claims. These liability limits represent the maximum amounts the company will pay for the
total of settlement or damage award payments to a claimant and payments for the legal
defense of the judge. Id.
127. For a description of the changes in the group rate charged since the policy was
first made available, see infra note 159. Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and
the District of Columbia have purchased coverage for all their judges under a "master
policy." Telephone conversation with Marnell Brunelli, Claims Coordinator, National
Union Insurance Co. (Oct. 18, 1989). The lower cost for the master policy as compared to




under these policies is provided for claims arising out of "any act,
error, or omission of the [judge, made in an] official judicial ca-
pacity (including but not limited to judicial, ministerial, adminis-
trative, and management acts)." 2" Thus, a judge covered by the
National Union Policy is indemnified against Pulliam-type attor-
ney's fees awards, as well as from damages arising out of hiring
decisions, record-keeping mistakes, and any other job-related
acts.1219 The National Union Policy further obligates the company
"to defend any suit against the Insured alleging acts, errors or
omissions falling within the coverage of this policy "1o30 Accord-
ingly, National Union provides coverage for all legal costs in-
curred in defending a lawsuit. Finally, the policy covers "all fees,
costs and expenses incurred in the defense of claims made to any
disciplinary committee, judicial competence committee, or any
similar official committee of inquiry 1131 With limited ex-
ceptions,132 the National Union Policy alleviates most job-related,
128. National Union State Judges Professional Liability Policy, Form No. 40197 at
I (March 1984) [hereinafter National Union Policy] (copies of this policy are available
from Herbert L. Jamison & Co., 300 Executive Drive, West Orange, N.J., 07052).
129. The National Union Policy is a "claims-made" policy. See id. at 1. A claims-
made policy obligates the insurance company to "defend and indemnify the insured only
for those claims actually made against the insured during the policy period." Block, Profes-
swnal and General Liability Insurance Coverage, 13 BARRISTER 31, 31 (1986). This type
of insurance assigns less risk to the insurer than an "occurrence" policy, which obligates
the insurer "to defend and indemnify the insured for any claims that arise in the
future as long as [the] policy [was] in force at the time" the act, error, or omission oc-
curred. Id. In other words, a claims-made policy provides coverage only for claims actually
reported to the company during the policy period, while an occurrence policy covers claims
which arise during the policy period, no matter when reported.
For an extra, one-time premium payment of $2,040, or 225 % of the insured's last
annual premium to National Union, a judge who discontinues the insurance coverage but
stays in office may procure an "Extended Reporting Endorsement;" the endorsement ex-
tends the claim reporting period into perpetuity, essentially converting the policy into an
"occurrence" policy. National Union Policy, supra note 128, at 4. The judge may also
extend the reporting period for three or six years by making an extra, one-time premium
payment of $800, or 100% of the insured's last annual premium, for a three year extension
and $1,200, or 150% of the last annual premium, for a six year extension. Id. A judge who
discontinues the insurance coverage upon leaving office may make a payment of $100 to
extend the claim reporting period into perpetuity. Death or disablement of the judge results
in free extension of the reporting period into perpetuity. Id.
130. National Union Policy, supra note 128, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Specific exclusions from coverage include: damages arising from, but not legal
fees incurred in defense of, criminal acts; injury or death caused by any act other than a
judicial decision; damages arising out of, but not legal fees incurred in defense of, a conflict
of interest; acts that the judge knew created liability and were performed prior to the
initiation of coverage; and punitive damages that are uninsurable by law. Id. at 2-3.
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monetary liability concerns a state judge might have.133
IV A CLOSER LOOK AT JUDICIAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
National Union "doesn't believe in advertising its judicial
malpractice coverage. ' 13 4 Consequently, most legal scholars and
practitioners are unaware of this new product. A close examina-
tion of the public policies and economics behind judicial malprac-
tice insurance has never been published. A "consumer's guide" to
judicial malpractice insurance is overdue.
Deciding whether to buy judicial malpractice insurance de-
pends on its price and the identity of the buyer. Specifically, it
must be determined whether the coverage is worth the premium,
and whether the states or the judges themselves should purchase
the coverage.
A. The Insurance is Not Worth the Premium
Compared to malpractice insurance costs for doctors135 and
lawyers,136 $800 seems inexpensive. In light of the remote poten-
tial for liability, however, the value of the coverage does not ap-
133. National Union also provides insurance coverage for federal judges. The federal
judge insurance policy is virtually identical to the state judge insurance policy except that:
I) the policy is an occurrence policy instead of a claims-made policy, compare supra note
129 (the state judge policy is written on a "claims-made" basis); 2) the limits of liability
are $500,000 per claim and $500,000 per year for all claims, compare supra, note 126 (the
state judge policy has liability limits of $1 million per claim and $2 million per year); and
3) the annual premium today is $200 compared to $100 when the policy was first made
available to federal judges in 1983, compare supra note 125 (the annual premium today is
$800 compared to $425 when the state judge policy was first made available in 1984).
Approximately 225 federal judges have purchased this insurance coverage from National
Union. Telephone interview with Lou Barbaro, Vice President, Herbert L. Jamison & Co.
(Feb. 23, 1990).
134. Hagedorn, supra note 121 at BI, col. 3. Insurers reason that public awareness
of this coverage would increase the likelihood of lawsuits. Id., see also Middleton, supra
note 1, at 1248 ("Many judges and court administrators foresee serious problems with the
insurance, including the fear that judges, once they start getting liability insurance, will
invite lawsuits from discontented litigants.").
135. The annual cost of a medical professional malpractice insurance policy, with
limits of liability similar to the judicial malpractice insurance policy, can range anywhere
from approximately $3,000 for a psychiatrist to over $100,000 for neurosurgeons. Tele-
phone interview with Thomas Visconsi, Chairman of the Board, Interstate Insurance Com-
pany, (Feb. 19, 1990).
136. The average annual cost of an attorney's professional malpractice insurance pol-
icy, with limits of liability similar to the judicial malpractice insurance policy, is approxi-
mately $3,000. Id., see also Jensen, Malpractice Insurance Rates Falling, Nat'l. L.J., Sept.
12, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (malpractice insurance rates for attorneys practicing in large firms
fell from roughly $4,000 to $3500 per attorney).
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proach the cost of the premium.
1. An Analysis of Judicial Risk
Since the scope of judicial immunity does not absolutely pre-
clude the risk of civil liability, a judge might pursue four options
to manage the residual risk: "risk avoidance, risk retention,
[risk] control and risk transfer. ' 13 7 A judge may choose to avoid
the residual risk altogether by leaving office;138 retain the risk by
personally paying any award of damages or attorney's fees;139 con-
trol the risk by reducing the frequency or severity of loss, perhaps
through legislation overturning Pulliam;140 or transfer the risk by
incurring the certain but limited expense of an insurance
premium."
Choosing among these options requires a judge to first per-
form an analysis of the residual risk. Judges face six categories of
risk under current judicial immunity doctrine:
1) "NonJudicial Act Peril 42 " damage awards or settlement
amounts arising from any official but nonjudicial act, such as im-
properly firing a court clerk;
2) "Unofficial Act Peril" damage awards or settlement
amounts arising from wholly unofficial acts undertaken while on
the job, such as assaulting a witness during trial;
3) "Criminal Act Peril"- damage awards or settlement
amounts arising from criminal acts undertaken while on the job,
such as conspiring to accept bribes in return for favorable
137. F CRANE, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES.6 (1980).
138. For example, the high risk of malpractice suits which attends medical special-
ties such as obstetrics has caused many doctors to either change their specialty or cease
practicing altogether. See Bunch, No-Fault Malpractice Urged, Newsday, Nassau Ed.,
Jan. 25, 1990, at 2, 33, col. I (seventy percent of obstetricians nationwide have been the
subject of a malpractice suit and approximately one-sixth of the obstetricians in New York
State have ceased practicing due to insurance costs).
139. Limited, as opposed to full, risk retention is also possible; this is the function of
a "deductible." An insurance policy with a $250 deductible represents retention of $250
worth of risk and transfer of the remainder of the risk. F. CRANE, supra note 137, at 37.
140. Risk control "is not an alternative to the other methods of handling risk but is
used in addition to one or more of them." Id. at 7. Risk control involves reducing both the
absolute number of losses that occur ("loss frequency") as well as the amount of those
losses that still do occur ("loss severity"). Id. Legislation overturning Pulliam would be an
absolute risk control mechanism, as it would reduce to zero both the number and amount
of attorney's fees awards against judges.
141. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
142. The term "peril" is defined as the "risk, hazard, or contingency insured against
by a policy of insurance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (6th ed. 1990).
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holdings;
4) "Defense Fees Peril" attorney's fees incurred to defend
against both valid and spurious allegations connected with the
Nonjudicial, Unofficial, and Criminal Act Perils, as well as attor-
ney's fees still necessarily incurred to defend against easily dis-
missed claims stemming from an immunized judicial act;
5) "Misconduct Investigation Peril" attorney's fees incurred
to defend against any claims of judicial misconduct brought by a
judicial conduct review board or disciplinary commission; and,
6) "Attorney's Fees Award Peril" attorney's fees awards to
plaintiffs bringing successful equitable actions under the Civil
Rights Act, as in Pulliam.
An analysis of each of these perils allows an evaluation of
judicial malpractice insurance. First, it is noteworthy that the first
five perils all existed prior to Pulliam. Thus, a judge who chose
not to engage in risk avoidance or risk transfer before Pulliam
must determine whether the additional exposure of the Attorney's
Fees Award Peril merits any change in risk-managing behavior.
The additional exposure created by Pulliam is actually quite
small - less than one percent of lawsuits against judges result in
attorney's fees awards . 4  This data suggests that the judiciary's
efforts to control or transfer their risk of loss from the Attorney's
Fees Award Peril, through legislation or insurance, are excessive
in relation to the incremental increase in risk that the peril
represents.4
143. Litigation Survey, supra note 120, at 45. Of the 1,974 surveyed cases involving
lawsuits filed against state judges during the years 1982 through 1987, 383 cases (19.4%)
included requests for attorney's fees. Only 18 cases (0.9% of the total, or 4.9% of those
cases requesting attorney's fees) ended with an actual attorney's fees award. Id. No dollar
amounts are listed in the survey.
144. This is not to say that Pulliam should be allowed to stand. In addition to creat-
ing exposure to economic liability, Pulliam arguably deters judges from enforcing the law.
[I]mposing the strait jacket of injunctive limitations destroys judges' usefulness
to a greater extent than the possibility of a suit for damages. [O]nce a
judge is enjoined by an order restricting his or her discretion in setting bail, the
usefulness of that judge in the arraignment process is, for all practical purposes,
eliminated.
Weisberger, supra note 27, at 552; see also Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings, supra note
82, at 197 (statement of Edwin Peterson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon)
("Pulliam deters state judges from enforcing the law."). But see generally Shapiro,
The Propriety of Prospective Relief and Attorney's Fees Awards Against State-Court
Judges in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 17 AKRON L. REV. 25, 36 (1983) (arguing that
injunctive relief does not deter law enforcement since it only requires that a judge act in a
manner consistent with the constitution and has no personal impact on the judge.)
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However, an examination of the aggregate risk of the six per-
ils is necessary to determine the most effective means of risk allo-
cation. Close examination shows that the total risk is less burden-
some than it initially appears. The risk to a judge of civil liability
flowing from each peril may be quantified as follows.
Defense Fees Peril. This peril represents little risk for most
judges, since nearly all jurisdictions provide legal representation to
judges when they are sued in their official capacities.145 Thus, the
only risk under the Defense Fees Peril would be legal defense fees
incurred when a judge is sued for unofficial misconduct; that is,
for alleged criminal or tortious acts committed while on the job.
Non-trivial allegations of this sort of judicial behavior are un-
usual, 46 as one would hope. Since the vast majority of judges does
not engage in the conduct that might cause such lawsuits, the De-
fense Fees Peril represents little risk to the typical judge.
NonJudicial Act Peril and Attorney's Fees Award Peril.
These two risks have both represented little danger historically
Just as most jurisdictions provide resources to relieve judges from
paying defense fees, states have indemnified their judges, even in
the absence of a legal obligation, from liability for damages or
145. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, A SURVEY OF STATE JUDICIAL FRINGE BENEFITS
(1988) (available from Information Service, National Center for State Courts) [hereinafter
Fringe Benefits Survey]. The Fringe Benefits Survey is a complete, state-by-state compari-
son of fringe benefits provided by each state to its judges. The survey determined that of
the 53 states and territories surveyed, all of them provided their judges with either legal
representation or reimbursement for representation when the judges were sued for "dam-
ages arising out of acts not wanton, reckless or malicious performed in the discharge of
official duties." Id. at 3. Furthermore, only Guam reported that it would not pay any attor-
ney's fees awards assessed against its judges. See also Ito, A National Survey Shows Wide
Variation in Actions Against Court Personnel, STATE CT. J., Summer 1982, at 9 (describ-
ing state variations in legal representation provided to judicial officers); Stafford, supra
note 27, at 37 (survey of fifty states and four territories revealed that all but two jurisdic-
tions cover the cost of a judge's representation and that the vast majority of these jurisdic-
tions employ the office of the state attorney general as official counsel).
146. For example, judicial conduct committees in Michigan disposed of 367 com-
plaints during 1986. Of these, 329, or 89.6% were dismissed as unfounded or frivolous. Of
the remaining 38 complaints, two complaints led to voluntary resignations of judges, two
complaints produced a public reprimand, and two resulted in removal of the judge from
office. The balance of the complaints led to no formal action. Other states reveal similar
patterns. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS - 1988 580-81 (1989) [hereinafter BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS] (available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, catalog no. NCJ- 118318). These statistics sug-
gest that valid allegations of official misconduct by judges are exceptional. But see King,
supra note 23, at 559 ("Injury to litigants cannot be called rare; many judges have been
implicated through the years.").
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attorney's fees awards arising from their official acts.1 47 States
have either paid for such awards against judges because of tort
claims statutes or other judicial indemnification statutes,14 8 or
simply as a matter of unwritten policy 149 Furthermore, it is not
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Specific evidence for this assertion
is largely anecdotal. Magistrate Pulliam, while personally liable for the attorney's fees
award settlement of $43,691.09, was relieved from making this payment; the State of Vir-
ginia paid for it. Legal Fees Equity Act Hearings, supra note 82, at 194. Similarly, Judge
Dillin conceded that in all three of the other cases he mentioned during Senate hearings to
illustrate substantial attorney's fees awards against judges, "attorney fees were ulti-
mately paid by a governmental unit " Id. at 207. These three other cases involved
payments of $98,000, $35,000, and $24,211. Id. The payments were made by the states
even though, in two of the three cases, no tort claims statute or judicial indemnification
statute explicitly required the state to do so. See id. at 207, 212-225.
In the same Senate hearings, Justice Peterson testified that he knew "of no case in
which a judge has personally paid fees." Id. at 314. Justice Peterson is in a position to
know of such cases, as he chaired the Task Force to Prepare a Report on the Impact of
Pulliam v. Allen for the Conference of Chief Justices; his Task Force conducted surveys of
1984 and 1988 litigation against judges, compiling reports of virtually all pertinent cases.
See Conference of Ciief Justices, Survey of State Statutes and Current Activities Regard-
ing Judicial Immunity, Indemnification and Insurance (January 1985) (report on 1984 sur-
vey results); Litigation Survey, supra note 120 (report on 1988 survey results). When ques-
tioned recently, Justice Peterson reaffirmed his assertion that he knows of no judge who has
personally paid damages or attorney's fees awards stemming from liability for an official
act. Telephone conversation with Oregon State Supreme Court Justice Edwin Peterson
(Jan. 18, 1990).
Justice Peterson's statement is echoed by the compiler of the statistics used in the
1988 Task Force Survey, Phillip A. Latimore. Mr. Latimore reports that 1,132 cases in-
volving claims against judges and other court personnel have reached final settlement or
judgment between 1982 and 1987. Litigation Survey, supra note 120, at 42. He further
reports that to his knowledge, none of these final determinations required payment by the
judges themselves: "the state finds the money." Telephone interview with Phillip A. La-
timore III, Staff Attorney, National Center for State Courts (Dec. 13, 1989).
These expert statements demonstrate that, in the end, judges are not held personally
liable for attorney's fees or damages awards, even though only about half of the fifty states
provide statutory or insurance liability coverage for their judges. Legal Fees Equity Act
Hearings, supra note 82, at 234-39. This outcome was predicted pending the Pulliam deci-
sion. See Shapiro, supra note 144, at 38-41.
148. Delaware, for example, has such a statute. Section 4001 of the Delaware Code
entitles any public employee to immunity so long as the act or omission complained of was
work related, was committed in good faith, and was not grossly negligent. Section 4002
states that an employee who meets the requirements of section 4001 "shall be indemnified
by the State against any expenses (including attorneys fees and disbursements), judgments,
fines and costs, actually and reasonably incurred in defending against [an] action, suit
or proceeding giving rise thereto." Tort Claims Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001-02
(Michie Supp. 1988). All states with such statutes have consistently indemnified their
judges even though "state indemnification statutes reveal[] widely varying and discretion-
ary standards for indemnifying the defendant judge." Roth & Hagan, The Judicial Immu-
nity Doctrine Today, supra note 29, at 11.
149. For example, even though it "was not legally bound to pay the fees assessed in
Pulliam," the State of Virginia intervened to pay the award. LEGAL FEas EQuITY AcT
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unusual for courts to simply find judges totally immune from lia-
bility even though the judge's act was official but not judicial. 150
Consequently, both the Nonjudicial Act Peril and the Attorney's
Fees Award Peril represent virtually no risk of civil liability to the
average judge.
Unofficial Act Peril, Criminal Act Peril, and Misconduct In-
vestigation Peril. State indemnification normally does not alleviate
these risks.15' Where damages or settlement amounts for assault-
ing a witness or accepting a bribe are awarded against a judge,
the judge will normally have to bear the cost personally Similarly,
the state is not apt to offer to pay the fees of the defense attorney
for a judge who 'is the subject of disciplinary proceedings.15 2
Therefore, the risks attending these three perils ultimately remain
with the judge.
The Misconduct Investigation Peril to some extent reiterates
the risk represented by the Defense Fees Peril, however, because
an unsuccessful defense against allegations of criminal behavior
will normally make unnecessary any misconduct investigation.
More importantly, the vast majority of judges will not behave in
such a way that a misconduct investigation by a disciplinary body
will occur. Likewise, few judges will ever pay damages because of
misconduct in office. To most judges the Unofficial Act Peril,
Criminal Act Peril, and Misconduct Investigation Peril represent
a fairly insignificant risk of civil liability
HEARINGS, supra note 82, at 207; see also id. at 194.
150. See, e.g., Chalk v. Elliot, 449 F Supp. 65 (N.D. Texas 1978) (holding judge
immune from damages arising out of admittedly ministerial act of denying application for
liquor license). For cases finding judges immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, see
Way, supra note 22 (examining federal and state cases from 1966-1978 involving judges as
defendants claiming judicial immunity); Note, Immunity Doctrines, supra note 51 (exam-
ining the inconsistent application of absolute judicial immunity in employment discrimina-
tion and wrongful discharge cases and recommending qualified immunity in its place);
Note, Judicial Act, supra note 51 (citing cases in which judges were granted immunity for
administrative acts).
151. Telephone interview with Oregon State Supreme Court Chief Justice Edwin
Peterson, Chairman of the Task Force to Prepare a Report on the Impact of Pulliam v.
Allen for the Conference of Chief Justices (Jan. 18, 1990). Judge Peterson reports that a
judge being investigated for criminal activity or misconduct normally pays defense costs
and damages unless the judge has purchased insurance personally. Statutory indemnifica-
tion and unwritten indemnificatory policy is often not triggered by allegations of such seri-
ous misconduct. Id.
152. But see Fringe Benefits Survey, supra note 145, at 17-21 (of 53 states and
territories in the United States surveyed, 7 paid for attorney's fees for judges involved in
disciplinary or ethics proceedings in certain circumstances; the remaining 47 did not pay
for such fees).
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Summary Due to judicial immunity protections and volun-
tary or statutory state risk absorption, the risk of civil liability
retained by judges is deceptively low This suggests that the choice
of risk avoidance is inappropriate; judges managing their risk in-
telligently should not leave office due to fears about their exposure
to civil liability 115 This leaves the options of risk transfer and risk
retention.5 A reasonable judge might choose to insure against
the risk of incurring civil liability, or instead choose to accept the
risk and pay for any liability that might arise.15 5 The determina-
tion depends on how the cost of judicial malpractice insurance
compares with the civil liability that a typical judge incurs.
2. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Risk Transfer
The price of judicial malpractice insurance determines
whether its purchase is an appropriate response to the potential
for liability An efficient price for judicial malpractice insurance
directly reflects the sum of three elements: the average cost of the
risk insured against, the expense involved in administering the in-
surance, and a reasonable profit.' 56
Actual profit, cost, and expense figures from private insur-
153. See Middleton, Suing a Judge: Malpractice Worries Grow, 69 A.B.A. J. 1808
(1983) ("Insurance seems more appropriate than wholesale flight from the bench.").
154. The option of risk control should always be pursued in conjunction with the
choice of risk transfer or risk retention. Regardless of whether a judge buys judicial mal-
practice insurance, judges should always refrain from criminal activity and avoid situations
or behavior suggesting misconduct in order to limit the possibility of incurring civil liabil-
ity. See supra note 140.
155. Not all of the risk remaining may be transferred; some of this risk must be
retained by the judge. For example, no insurance policy will insure against liability arising
out of wilful tortious or criminal acts, as a matter of law and public policy. This public
policy is "designed to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully with the security of know-
ing that his insurance company will 'pay the piper' for the damages." Transamerica Ins.
Group v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351, 356, 694 P.2d 181, 186 (1984); see also infra note 184
(noting that the "damn fool doctrine" has developed to exclude coverage for certain acts on
social policy grounds). See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 493-99
(1988) (discussing the "widespread judicial recognition of the public's interest in re-
stricting the use of insurance to transfer risk ").
Accordingly, the National Union Policy contains the following provision: "This policy
does not apply to any claim arising out of any criminal act or omission; however, the
Company shall defend any such claims until a final adjudication of such liability "
National Union Policy, supra note 128, at 2. The policy also excludes from coverage "any
punitive or exemplary damages where such damages are uninsurable pursuant to the law
under which such damages are awarded; however, the Company shall provide a defense for
any claims covered by this policy seeking such damages." Id. at 3.
156. F CRANE, supra note 137, at 29 ("[Tihe company's premium income must
be sufficient to pay its policyholder's losses and meet company expenses.").
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ance companies are not easily obtainable, but the price may be too
high for National Union's coverage. The State of Ohio, for exam-
ple, has purchased annually from National Union a group policy
covering all of its own state judges every year since 1985."'1 In
1988, this policy covered 790 judges. 158 At the group rate of $650
per judge, annual premiums of $513,500 were paid in 1988.
Therefore, Ohio paid roughly $2.0 million in premiums for the
period of 1985 through 1988.159 Over the same period, the total
amount paid out by National Union under the Ohio group policy
was $216,870.05, or roughly 10% of premium collected.160 Na-
tional Union placed another $226,593.07 in reserve for cases
pending final resolution.16 1 This represents a total expected loss
ratio16 2 of approximately twenty-two percent. Thus, National
Union expects that less than twenty-five cents from every dollar
157. Telephone interview with Steven Stover, Administrator of Ohio Courts (Oct.
23, 1989).
158. Id.
159. The fluctuation in the group rate since 1985 has been as follows.
YEAR RATE
1985 .................................................. $475 per judge
1986 .................................................. $675 per judge
1987 .................................................. $675 per judge
1988 .................................................. $675 per judge
1989 ........................................ $650 per judge
The number of judges insured under the Ohio master policy has also fluctuated, generally
ranging near 800 per year. Telephone interview with Lou Barbaro, Vice President, Herbert
L. Jamison & Co. (Feb. 23, 1990). The $2 million total premium paid during the period
1985 through 1988 is thus approximate and may in fact be low, depending on when during
the year the rate changes went into effect, when during the year the group policy was
purchased, and how many judges were actually insured.
160. Herbert L. Jamison & Co., Lawyers Professional Liability (April 12, 1989)
(computer generated claims listing provided by Marnell Brunelli, Claims Coordinator, Na-
tional Union Insurance Co.). The entire amount represents payments of legal fees to defend
judges against claims. The claims listing shows that National Union made no expenditure
for actual damages or attorney's fees awards. Id.
161. Id. This amount is commonly called a "loss reserve" and "represent[s] the esti-
mated cost to the company of settling all of the claims for losses that already have occurred
but have not yet been paid." F. CRANE, supra, note 137 at 439. Thus, National Union
currently expects future claims stemming from the 1985 through 1988 period of Ohio
group policy coverage to total no more than $226,593.07. This estimate is comprised of
projected costs for defending Ohio judges against future claims and for paying future set-
tlements and damage awards.
162. "The loss ratio is the percentage of the premium paid by insureds required to
pay losses." J. ATHEARN, RiSK AND INSURANCE 403 (1977). National Union's expected loss
ratio for its judicial malpractice insurance is thus represented by a fraction whose numera-
tor is the amount of claims actually paid plus the amount of claims expected to be paid by
National Union for its insured judges, and whose denominator is the amount of premiums
paid by all judges for their insurance.
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received for insurance coverage will be needed to pay for claims
connected with their Ohio judicial malpractice insurance group
policy.
There are several possible explanations for imposing an ap-
parently excessive premium. First, high administrative costs may
inflate the insurance premium.'63 Second, the National Union Pol-
icy is unnecessarily broad in its coverage, exceeding the level of
protection required to effectively bear the existing risk.'6 Third,
the National Union Policy involved a novel type of insurance cov-
erage. Initial rate-setting had to have been largely guesswork.
Caution counselled excessive, not inadequate, premium levels. 65
Fourth, the claims experience of Ohio's judges may be an aberra-
tion. One claim for a large amount could double the expected loss
ratio. 6 Finally, National Union created its policy during a period
of accelerating rates of lawsuits against judges.'67 Therefore,
avoiding future rate increases required initially high rates. The
fact remains, however, that the premiums charged by National
163. This explanation is not persuasive because National Union is a very large com-
pany. See supra note 121. Start-up costs for its judicial malpractice insurance program
were probably minimal, and most of the claims adjustment and other necessary systems
were already in place.
164. For example, the National Union Policy originally allowed the judge, with writ-
ten consent from the company, to select and retain counsel of the judge's own choosing.
National Union Policy, supra note 128, part 11(c) at 1. Pure risk transfer merely calls for
providing the judge with counsel of the company's own choosing, and only when necessary
because the state attorney's office does not provide counsel. The policy thus insured against
incompetent or inadequate representation.
This generosity, however, has been limited. National Union now endorses all of its
policies to disallow judges this option. Id. at Endorsement A. Furthermore, this increment
of "additional insurance" was small and would in any event have been reflected in the loss
costs already included in the Defense Fees Peril. See supra text accompanying notes 145-
46.
165. Knowledge of historical losses allows a company to accurately quantify its risk
and set premiums accordingly. With no historical loss data, premiums are best kept high to
ensure adequate capital from which loss payments may be made. A company can always
make subsequent downward adjustments. See F. CRANE, supra note 137, at 402-03.
166. The claims experience of Ohio's insured judges is unlikely to differ significantly
from the claims experience of the entire population of judges insured by National Union,
simply because Ohio's insured judges make up nearly one third (790/2496) of this popula-
tion. But the occurrence of one very large loss that changes Ohio's claims experience is not
inconceivable. See infra note 170.
167: As early as 1981, judges were concerned with "the soaring increase in lawsuits"
filed against them. Middleton, supra note 1, at 1248; see also Moskowitz, State Jurists
Become Targets in Wave of Litigation, Wash. Post, April 15, 1985, Washington Business,
at 19, col. 1 (noting the increase in suits against judges in their official capacity).
The table below shows the number of lawsuits based on civil rights violations brought
during this period against court personnel, acting in their official capacity:
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Union to provide judicial malpractice insurance far exceed the
costs associated with the risk transferred.
It should be noted that National Union responded quickly to
the judiciary's requests to create an insurance policy that met cer-
tain requirements: high limits of liability, coverage for legal de-
fense costs, and no deductible. 6 This quick response, and a will-
ingness to insure virtually any judge who applied for the
insurance, justifiably earned National Union a designation from
the Conference of Chief Justices as creators of a "model policy"
of judicial malpractice insurance.
After five years of experience, however, buyers of judicial
malpractice insurance from National Union are justified in re-
questing that the company re-examine its rate structure. Judges
should not expect an insurer to operate without a profit: "[i]nsurer
solvency is essential for the insured ... ."I69 Neither should
judges assume judicial malpractice insurance is worthless at any
YEAR CASES
1982 ................................................ 198
1983 .............. . ................................ ..... 286
1984 ........................................................... 433
After this period, however, the number of lawsuits brought leveled off:
YEAR CASES
1985 ................................................ 281
1986 ................................... ....................... 418
1987 ........................................................... 358
Litigation Survey, supra note 120, at 35. The latter data illustrates that National Union's
anticipated increase in lawsuits against judges did not occur.
168. The requirements set by the judiciary, however, were not necessarily good ones.
One of the "basic rules" for buying insurance is "not to insure small losses even if they
occur frequently." F. CRANE, supra note 137, at 40 (emphasis in original). For this reason
the judiciary should have insisted on a deductible. According to Crane:
Insuring small losses is unnecessary, wastes money, and drains away funds that
can be spent more wisely on other insurance. Many people ignore this rule.
Insuring small losses is uneconomical for two reasons. First, as many small
[claims] ... are bound to [be made], premiums on policies that cover them
must be high simply to reimburse policyholders for them. Second, the premiums
must also allow for the overhead costs of handling the numerous small claims. If
it costs $20 just to process a small claim, an insurer must spend a total of $45 to
pay a $25 loss. It therefore makes sense to pay small losses out of one's own
pocket, perhaps by use of policy deductibles, and to buy insurance to cover large
losses only.
Id. at 40-41.
Another "basic rule[]" for buying insurance is to "[g]et help from a good agent." Id.
at 40. "Good insurance agents provide risk management counselling and advice. They offer
valuable suggestions concerning the kinds and amounts of protection that are most appro-
priate for their clients." Id. at 42.
169. J. ATHEARN, supra note 162, at 401.
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price. Although most judges carrying such insurance will never
make a claim, those who do find great comfort in the coverage. 17 0
But judges should demand that the rates charged by National
Union "not be more than adequate. 17 1
B. States Should Not Purchase Judicial Malpractice Insurance
Separate from the quantitative question of whether judicial
malpractice insurance is too expensive is the qualitative question
of whether it is appropriate for the state to pay any amount for
such insurance. Even if the insurance premium is actuarially
valid, states must determine whether they should pay the pre-
mium or leave this to judges personally.
Unavoidably, arguments regarding state-paid indemnification
reflect arguments for and against judicial immunity. Those who
argue in favor of restricting the scope of judicial immunity 1 2 are
likely to argue that judges themselves should pay for damage
awards or for insurance against damage awards. Conversely, those
who believe that exposure to attorney's fees awards improperly er-
odes judicial immunity are apt to insist that judicial immunity is
best kept intact through state indemnification.
However, to advocate or reject state payment of judicial mal-
practice insurance premiums based solely on unsubstantiated fears
of promoting judicial irresponsibility is simplistic.'7 Public policy
170. For example, one Massachusetts judge is reported to have incurred over
$300,000 in legal defense fees alone, before the claims against him were finally resolved.
Telephone interview with Robert Gault, outside counsel for A.I.G. (Nov. 8, 1990). See
generally Strahinich, The Case Against Judge Monte Basbas, BosToN MAG., Mar. 1989,
at 116 (detailing numerous misconduct charges filed against Judge Basbas with the Massa-
chusetts Judicial Conduct Commission.). Judge Basbas's National Union Policy covered
virtually the entire amount of his liability. Even if the state would have considered paying
for this expense, any judge in this position would likely believe that assured coverage was
worth the $800 policy premium.
171. J. ATHEARN, supra note 162, at 401.
172. See supra note 99 (list of sources critical of absolute judicial immunity).
173. The experience in Nevada is instructive:
[Nevada's] Senate Finance Committee rejected a request by the Nevada District
Judges Association to appropriate $41,300 to provide up to $2 Million in insur-
ance coverage for each of the state's 108 judges.
Sen. Joe Neal of Las Vegas, [sic] added, "I don't think it should be the
committee's duty to ensure mediocrity in the judiciary. Judges should render
decisions based on what the law states. If they go beyond the law, they should
accept the consequences like everyone else.
Comment, supra note 81, at 493 n.280 (quoting Judges Due Help in Rights Suits, A.G.
Opinion Says, L.A. Daily Journal, June 7, 1985 at 19, col. 2).
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arguments concerning state payment of judicial malpractice insur-
ance premiums are best made in the context of each separate peril
insured against by the National Union Policy.174 Assuming that
these risks are sufficient to warrant the purchase of insurance, 17 5
several arguments can be made in- favor of and in opposition to
state indemnification of the judge against each peril.
Defense Fees Peril and Misconduct Investigation Peril. Al-
though it may be inappropriate for an insurer to pay for an in-
sured's liability arising from certain types of behavior, courts have
held that it is appropriate for an insurer to provide legal defense
for an insured against the same claims.70 Thus, while public pol-
icy may not support insurance against a judge's criminal conduct,
coverage for legal defense costs against allegations of criminal be-
havior is not improper. Fears that the result of such insurance
would be a subsidy of judicial misconduct are not well-founded.
State payment for such insurance, however, is a concern sep-
arate from the advisability of such coverage. Upon first examina-
tion, public policy seems to support state payment of the insurance
costs connected with the Defense Fees and Misconduct Investiga-
tion Perils. The vast majority of lawsuits against judges, whether
civil suits or investigations of misconduct initiated by disgruntled
litigants, are dismissed .177 Thus, a state's payment for its judges'
defense or insurance costs protects judges from harassing litiga-
tion and prevents wasting valuable judicial time.
An argument can be made, however, that the state should
absorb the Defense Fees Peril from its judges only through the use
of state-appointed counsel, not state-paid insurance. Counsel pro-
174. See supra pp. 289-90 (the perils insured against include the Nonjudicial Act
Peril, the Unofficial Act Peril, the Criminal Act Peril, the Defense Fees Peril, the Miscon-
duct Investigation Peril, and the Attorney's Fees Award Peril).
175. Some of these perils are insignificant, either because the state already pays for
the costs associated with the peril, as is the case with the Defense Fees Peril, or because
judges rarely find themselves faced with situations that would force payment of the costs
associated with the peril, as with the Attorney's Fees Award Peril. See supra text accom-
panying notes 145-50.
176. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104 (1966) (reasoning that relief from responsibility for legal defense against alleged mis-
conduct does not eliminate responsibility for actual misconduct).
177. Of the 1,139 reported lawsuits against judges based on claims of civil rights
violations that were resolved between 1982 and 1987, the judge prevailed in 1,085 (95.3%)
of them. Litigation Survey, supra note 120, at 42. Many of the lawsuits were frivolous pro
se actions. Id. at 1. In one year, 90% or more of the complaints made to judicial conduct
commissions were dismissed, or led to no formal action. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, supra note 146, at 580-81.
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vided by the insurance company will not have "the effect of pro-
viding greater state supervision over judicial conduct in state
courts . . . [which] would . . . provide greater assurances that
judges exercise their judicial offices with propriety." '178 Thus, em-
ploying private sector attorneys instead of state employees to de-
fend state judges could lead to inappropriate attempts at risk con-
trol. The insurance company will be more concerned with teaching
judges to avoid any conduct that might lead to a lawsuit, while
the state would more properly be concerned only with teaching
judges to avoid unconstitutional conduct. In sum, the use of public
funds to relieve judges from the burden of defending against
mostly frivolous claims may be a valid expenditure, but buying
insurance is not an appropriate means of relieving this burden.
Criminal Act Peril. Wilful criminal acts are not and gener-
ally cannot be insured against.1 9 Therefore, when the state pays
for judicial malpractice insurance it is not insuring its judges
against liability for damages arising from their criminal acts, al-
though associated legal defense fees are covered. To the extent
that judicial malpractice insurance does not insure against the
Criminal Act Peril, there is no public policy argument against
state payment for the insurance.
Attorney's Fees Award Peril. It has been suggested that, ab-
sent insurance, the award of attorney's fees against a judge is
largely determined by the state itself. Since states defend their
judges as a matter of course,18° an attorney's fees award against a
judge "would accrue only if and to the extent that the state, on
behalf of the judge, decided to litigate whether the judge could
constitutionally continue the challenged practice."'' Unless a
judge decided to fight an injunction despite the state's agreement
with the plaintiff's position, only de minimis attorney's fees
awards against judges would arise without the state's consent. If
the state wrongly defended its judges' actions, fairness dictates
that the state should pay for any attorney's fees awards if the
plaintiff finally succeeds.
When a state pays for judicial malpractice insurance, how-
ever, the enjoined judge determines whether to fight an injunction
without input from state-appointed counsel. A judge properly en-
178. Comment, supra note 81, at 493.
179. See supra note 155.
180. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
181. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 40-41.
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joined could, foolishly or stubbornly, decide alone to litigate a
clearly unconstitutional practice, causing attorney's fees awards to
mount needlessly 182 Situations could occur where the insurance
company might pay settlement costs or attorney's fees awards that
far exceed the amount that the state might pay if it refused to
litigate on behalf of the judge. State payment for insurance
against the Attorney's Fees Award Peril thus removes an appro-
priate restraint against a judge's pursuit of expensive and ground-
less litigation.
Unofficial Act Peril. It is almost senseless to argue that the
state should pay for damages arising from a judge's actions that
are wholly unofficial and clearly represent misconduct. Imagine,
for example, a judge who sexually harasses lawyers in the court-
room.'8 3 No public policy is served by using public funds to insure
against liability stemming from such behavior. In fact, because
protecting such behavior serves no tenable interest, insurers nor-
mally refuse coverage for such acts.'8 As such, state payment for
judicial malpractice insurance might not extend to insuring
against the Unofficial Act Peril; the peril is not normally insured
against in any event. Like the Criminal Act Peril, then, no public
182. The only limitation on such abuse is the insurance company's right to settle.
National Union's right to settle is stated in the National Union Policy as follows:
It is agreed that if the Insured shall refuse to consent to any settlement recom-
mended by the Company and acceptable to the claimant that the Company's
liability under this policy shall not exceed the amount for which the claim could
have been settled together with claims expenses incurred as of the time of the
Insured's refusal to settle.
National Union Policy, supra note 128, at I.
183. See, e.g., Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, I0 Cal. 3d 270, 277-
79 n.6, 515 P.2d 1, 5-6 n.6, II0 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205-06 n.6 (1973) (detailing the appalling
behavior of Judge Geiler), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
184. Nonpayment for liability of this sort would not depend solely on an explicit
coverage exclusion in the insurance policy. The National Union Policy excludes from cover-
age "any claim for bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any person or for injury
to or destruction of any tangible property including the loss of use thereof, except when
arising out of a judicial decision or order "National Union Policy, supra note 128, at
2.
Even without this exclusion, however, National Union could rely on the "damn fool"
doctrine:
[C]ourts usually sustain an insurer's denial of claims when the losses result from
incredibly foolish conduct.
A "damn fool" doctrine is embodied in the statement that insurance cover-
age, especially liability coverage, is not provided fdr acts-which are simply too ill
conceived [sic] to warrant allowing the actor to transfer the risk of such conduct
to an insurer.
R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 155, at 539.
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policy argument against state payment for judicial malpractice in-
surance can be made to the extent that the insurance does not
insure against the Unofficial Act Peril.
Nonjudicial Act Peril. Like criminal acts or unofficial mis-
conduct, little justification exists for the state to pay to insure
against a judge's liability for improper official acts. Racial, sexual,
or religious discrimination in hiring or firing is the archetypal non-
judicial act. The state can properly supply legal defense costs
against this type of claim. If the claim is proved valid, however, no
public policy argument supports protecting the judge from liabil-
ity.185 The existing parameters of judicial immunity allow the lia-
bility of a judge for improper official acts.186 To hold judges per-
sonally liable for disregarding anti-discrimination policies and
then to relieve them of that liability via state-paid insurance is
inconsistent. Judges who are uncomfortable with exposure to this
risk should pay to insure against the risk themselves.
Summary. State payment for its judges' professional liability
insurance is inappropriate. By paying for judicial malpractice in-
surance, the state insulates its judges from liability for wrongful
acts of discrimination, may in rare instances relieve judges from
liability for criminal acts or acts of serious misconduct, and
reduces the level of supervision over its judges. While transfer of
certain risks from the judges to the state is appropriate, use of
insurance as a risk-transfer mechanism produces undesirable side
effects. On balance, if the state were to discontinue paying for its
judges' judicial malpractice insurance, judges would remain in-
demnified against risks properly shouldered by the state but would
no longer evade liability they properly should retain.
185. In fact, if a discrimination claim against a judge is adjudicated and results in
an award for the plaintiff, judicial malpractice insurance would not cover the award. Cov-
erage would be excluded because a successful discrimination claim requires "persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff ...."
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). As such, cover-
age would be denied under the wilful act exclusion, leaving the judge to pay the damage
award personally. See supra note 155.
Nonetheless, state payment of judicial malpractice insurance premiums still has the
effect of relieving judges from liability for discriminatory practices because many valid
discrimination claims are not adjudicated, but are settled-without admission of fault. The
National Union Policy would cover such settlement amounts, thus insulating the judge
from liability for actual but unacknowledged misconduct.
186. Because hiring and firing decisions are not judicial acts, judicial immunity does




The loss of absolute judicial immunity occurred gradually
through rulings that judges could be held liable for official but
nonjudicial acts, and also occurred suddenly when Pulliam held
state judges liable for attorney's fees awards under section
1988.187
In the marketplace for judicial services, suppliers (judges)
and consumers (accused criminals, civil litigants, and the general
public) reacted to this loss of absolute judicial immunity Con-
sumers reacted with more lawsuits against judges. Suppliers re-
sponded by obtaining indemnification against liability and by
seeking legislation to erase their liability
Judges obtained indemnification through a new product, com-
monly called judicial malpractice insurance. Wise purchase of any
product, especially a new one, requires a cost-benefit analysis; that
is, buyers must be certain that the price is reasonable. If the in-
surance companies are unable to defend the rates charged, buyers
should request a rate reduction or a rebate, seek another insurer,
or self-insure with a clear knowledge of the total risk retained.
Only through demanding information from their insurance com-
pany and acting on it, however, will buyers of this new product
cause the marketplace to act efficiently
The public should also question the use of state funds to pro-
cure insurance for the judiciary as a matter of policy, even if the
price is justified. Judges buying their own malpractice insurance
are acting as appropriately as doctors or lawyers who buy mal-
practice insurance for themselves. However, the expenditure of
public funds to allow state judicial officials to escape liability for
improper or ill-advised conduct is poor public policy Moreover, it
is the duty of the state to supervise its own judges. Paying the
private sector to defend judges removes this supervision and may
thereby damage the quality of judicial services offered.
Finally, even inefficient marketplace responses to the loss of
absolute judicial immunity are preferable to restoration of abso-
lute judicial immunity Against the alternative of leaving individu-
als injured by judicial misconduct without remedy, payments for
187. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
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judicial malpractice insurance that are excessive or improperly
shouldered by the state are still a better, and more just, solution.
DAVID R. COHEN
